Game Management

For head coaches, game management largely comes down to challenges, clock management and fourth-down choices. Rivera’s challenge record is actually quite good, as while a 49% success rate might not sound hugely impressive, it compares well to 41% for Bill Belichick, 47% for Pete Carroll and 46% for Andy Reid. Not only is he more successful at challenging than these other coaches, but he also challenges more often, with an average of 6.7 challenges per season, ahead of Carroll’s 6, Reid’s 5.8 and Belichick’s 4.7. This could be an abnormal sample group for the NFL, but compared to three coaches with a combined 640 wins between them, Rivera certainly appears to be very good at how he uses his challenges.

Clock management has, however, been something of an issue for the Panthers in recent seasons, with there being repeated issues of timeouts having to be used in order to avoid delay of game penalties. While that appears to have improved with the firing of Mike Shula, the jury is still far from conclusive in Rivera’s favor despite that. The most common criticism in this regard has been his clock management in the final minutes of halves, either looking to run out the clock effectively to limit how much time the opponent inherits the ball with or to give the offense enough time to get a score; the issue at least seems to be one of extreme caution rather than shear ineptitude.

There is a similar story when it comes to Rivera’ strategy on fourth down. Despite the ‘Riverboat’ moniker he earned during the Panthers’ 2013 run, Rivera has actually been cautious when it comes to his attitudes on fourth down, and there are few clearer examples of that than the Panthers game this Sunday against the Eagles. On their second drive of the game, the Eagles faced a fourth-and-1 at the Panthers’ 45 and got it. Later on on that drive, they faced a fourth-and-5 at the Panthers’ 39, and went for it again successfully. Then, late in the third and faced with another fourth-and-1, this time from the Panthers’ 3, the Eagles went for it again, and again were successful. Of course, teams aren’t always going to go 3-for-3 on fourth down, but there is a method to this madness.

All of the fourth downs the Eagles went for were manageable, within five yards where the team has the option of both passing or rushing with a reasonable expectation of success. They also only went for fourth downs in areas where there was a significant benefit from picking up an additional set of downs. On the first two fourth downs, their only other options were long field goals with limited chances of success or punts from inside the opposition half. While the Eagles ultimately missed the short field goal they ended up with on this drive, both fourth down conversion lead to a significant increase in their odds of scoring points on this drive without a significant risk in terms of field position. Similarly, by going for the fourth-and-1 from the three, the Eagles gave themselves of adding seven points rather than three, and if they had failed, at least they would have pinned the Panthers back deep.

Faced with almost identical situations, however, the Panthers largely opted to punt the ball. Fourth-and-5 from the Philly 44 and fourth-and-3 from the Panthers’ 42 were both punted by the Panthers. This pattern extends well beyond this weekend’s game, as throughout most of his time in Carolina, Rivera has been very hesitant to go for it on fourth down inside the middle forty yards of the field. Going for these fourth downs can backfire, as happened to the 49ers against Carolina in 2017, but all the data suggests that more often than not it’s the right thing to do. Given that this team has struggled for momentum at times, Rivera’s reluctance to go for it could well be one of the factors holding this offense back.

What is important to note is that these failings are not incompetence on Rivera’s part, at least not necessarily.

This team isn’t consistently botching late-game situations due to clock mismanagement or, as Charles Davis suggested during Sunday’s broadcast, risking losing games by being unwilling to go for it on crucial fourth downs late in games by opting to punt the ball back to the defense with two minutes or less to go – what it has been, however, is somewhat restrained by Rivera’s caution, as by looking to punt the ball as a first instinct and by not looking to take limited risks to put points on the board before halves, he has likely put an unnecessary ceiling on the offensive capabilities of the team.

Hiring And Firing

Steve Wilks

All head coaches need good people around them in order to succeed, but for coaches like Rivera who don’t take full control over either the offense or the defense, this is even more important than it is for those like Kyle Shanahan or Sean McDermott who are, at their cores, coordinators who throw challenge flags. Therefore, while Rivera cannot be directly blamed for any failings for those beneath him, since a major part of his role is hiring said people, their failings – or successes – are by extension his as well.

On defense, the Panthers have been forced into changes out of Rivera’s control with both Sean McDermott and Steve Wilks being hired away in consecutive seasons, with Wilks also taking position coaches with him to Arizona. While McDermott had something of a slow start in Carolina, the defense he inherited in 2011 was lacking talent on all three levels, and the team did grow over time to the point where, in 2013, it was one of the very best in the NFL despite questionable talent in the secondary. While the seasons under McDermott after that were a little more mixed, he consistently produced top-tier defenses with a penchant for turnovers and negative plays. While his tenure in Buffalo hasn’t been hugely impressive, one thing that became clear when he took back over defensive playcalling earlier this season is that Sean McDermott can really design and implement a defense.

This was a Rivera hire, and he should rightly be praised for it.

When McDermott left for Buffalo,  Rivera looked to promote from within, and while Steve Wilks may well become a decent head coach in the Rivera mold, the 2017 Panthers’ defense was a far more mixed grouping than under McDermott, suffering from an over-aggressive tendency to man-blitz, which in turn made them susceptible to chunk passing plays. When Wilks left for Arizona, Rivera once again promoted from within, and while Eric Washington has shown some positive signs, this defense has also lacked discipline at times and Washington’s playcalling is still waiting to find its groove. There is nothing wrong with promoting from within and Eric Washington has certainly done enough to merit a chance to progress beyond defensive line coach, but it is worth noting that not once, but twice, Rivera opted to hire people he was familiar with rather than looking to explore options outside the existing coaching group.

On offense, the Panthers have again had something of a mixed history under Rivera. Rob Chudzinski led the Panthers to top 10 offensive rankings in both of his seasons in Carolina, and as a result was hired by the Browns as their head coach. While Chud hasn’t had a coaching career of note since leaving Carolina, he did lead the Panthers to their best offensive seasons under Rivera and, as with McDermott, should be seen as a successful hiring by Rivera. When Chudzinski moved on, Rivera once again looked to promote from within, making quarterbacks coach Mike Shula the offensive coordinator. While Shula helped build the 2015 unit which led the NFL in points, his record in the other four seasons he spent in Carolina is far more mixed, despite excellent offensive personnel at times. Shula’s stay in Carolina might have been extended by a stellar 2015 season, but the fact that he was able to spend five seasons with the team despite lackluster offensive output again speaks to Rivera’s loyalty to the people below him.

Speaking of loyalty, when the Panthers did finally fire Shula, they almost immediately hired Norv Turner, who Rivera had previously been the defensive coordinator for in San Diego. Turner has an excellent history in the NFL, but his recent performances have been more mixed, and the 2018 Panthers’ offense has had some highs and lows through the first six games. As with Washington, it is too early to pass significant judgement about this hire, but what is once again evident is how Rivera prefers to hire people he is familiar with. This isn’t inherently a bad thing, but this apparent unwillingness to go outside of his comfort area will limit the development of the Panthers’ coaching staff, if it hasn’t done so already.

Even on the field, Rivera has shown remarkable loyalty to a handful of players. Amini Silatolu is currently in his seventh NFL season, almost all of which have been with Carolina, despite being consistently graded as one of the worst offensive linemen in the NFL by PFF and while that is far from a perfect system, Silatolu has done little to merit an extended NFL career, especially given his injury history, but yet he remains on the Panthers’ roster and even entered training camp as the starting left guard. While this seems to have changed a bit this season, Rivera’s first instinct has always appeared to be to go with what he knows over what might be a better, if less certain option.

Donte Jackson is comfortably the highest graded rookie corner this season, but entered the preseason behind Kevon Seymour on the depth chart, and only got the starting job after some woeful showings and shoulder surgery. Andrew Norwell only got a starting job when Amini Silatolu went down with an injury, a story that was repeated this offseason with Greg Van Roten. I don’t think this is an inability to judge talent on behalf of the scouting department, but rather a reflection that Rivera’s first instinct is always to go with what he knows. As with some aspects of his game management, Rivera’s attitudes in terms of hiring and firing suggest a high degree of caution in his decision making; sometimes caution is good, but when it is a consistent reaction, regardless of the situation, it is going to lead to sub-optimal decision making.

Motivation

A coach’s ability to motivate players and to prepare them mentally for games is always going to be hard to tie down, and it is certainly not possible to talk about these things in anything like concrete terms. However, Rivera’s ability to get his players ready can be judged based on their performances in games, especially early on, and that has certainly been an issue the past two weeks. Against both Washington and the Eagles, the Panthers have let their opponents build 17-0 leads, forcing the Panthers to chase three-score deficits on the road, leading to a 23-17 loss and a miraculous 21-17 win. Both performances were error-strewn and came across as unfocused and lackluster.

Rivera’s teams have, generally, done well on big games such as on Monday Night and Thursday Night Football, but the moniker ‘Cardiac Cats’ hardly speaks to a team that has the mental edge to put lesser teams away, even if they are also able to come away with some remarkable comebacks. Rivera has even spoken about his failings to get his players focused in the past, as he did after the loss to Atlanta that put the Panthers at 14-1 in the 2015 season when he spoke about how his players hadn’t seemed focused throughout the week. While this was a lone game, the fact that he was apparently aware of the lack of focus and yet was unable to change that doesn’t do his reputation as a motivator much good. What is more, the Panthers seemed to once again lack focus before their loss in the Super Bowl, a game in which they were plagued by sloppy errors and unforced mistakes.

I should say at this point that I actually think Rivera is an extremely nice man, who seems to genuinely care for his players and who has done an awful lot for the Charlotte area and beyond, certainly a coach that hasn’t deserved much of the criticism that has come his way at times. The 2016 Panthers were undone by a rash of offensive line injuries the likes of which no team would survive, and even managed to go 6-10 losing a number of close games late; even after last season, it should be noted that he led a team to an 11-5 record despite injuries to the offensive line and receiving corps that could have ended any chance they had of even making the postseason.

He is not a two-time NFL Coach of the Year for nothing, and to hold anybody – coach or player – to the standard of being perfect would be completely unreasonable. What is true, however, is that this season marks a fork in the road for Rivera. He has arguably the most talented roster he has ever had in Carolina, he was able to hand-pick his offensive and defensive coordinators before the season and, while this team has had some injuries, there is no one area of the team that has fallen apart in the way the offensive line did in 2016 or the receiving corps did last season.

Oh, and the Panthers have a new owner who has made it very clear that he is willing to make changes if he doesn’t think things are working.

Again, this is not a ‘Fire Rivera piece’, no coach should be fired after a 4-2 start; it’s rather an assessment focused on the areas which he can control. This team doesn’t need to win a Super Bowl for this season not to be a failure, but given the talent they have and the amount of time he has had to build this team in his image – as should be clear at this stage, that image is one dominated by cautious decision making – this is likely the most precarious that his job has been since 2013; while Rivera is sometimes wise to exercise caution, a more aggressive approach, if implemented intelligently, could help the Panthers take the step from good to great. In the words of one of British TV’s greatest characters, Del Boy Trotter, sometimes “he who dares, wins”, and if Rivera isn’t willing to take a few more chances, David Tepper might fancy a gamble of his own.

Vincent Richardson on Twitter
Vincent Richardson
Managing Editor at Riot Report
Fan of zone coverage, knee bend and running backs running routes. Twitter: @vrichardson444